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James Corby (University of Malta) 
 
[PAPER PRESENTED AT THE ‘IMAGINING SPACES/PLACES’ CONFERENCE 
(HELSINKI, 24-26 AUGUST 2011)] 
 
Spatially, Cormac McCarthy‟s The Road is starkly simple. Although the basic schema 
permits many variations, I would argue that there are qualitatively only three spaces in 
the entire novel. These are the road itself, the sea, and chanced-upon, variously 
manifested domestic space. These closely interdependent spaces structure the 
narrative and allow for the staging of an exploration of memory and childhood, as 
well as providing the context for a compelling but never fully articulated ethical 
demand to emerge. 
 
The road is a threateningly exposed and entirely desperate place that offers no refuge 
or sustenance. Roving gangs of half-starved cannibals travel the road, as does their 
food, the last remaining, pitiful detritus of humanity, aimlessly and hopelessly 
wandering. Chronotopically, the road exists in the pitiless zero hour of a present 
bereft of past and future [there is no past, 55; the hour. There is no later. This is later, 
56]. 
 
What encourages the Man and Boy on their journey through the hostile space of the 
road is another of the novel‟s three spaces, the sea. The potency of this space, the 
reason why it counts in McCarthy‟s novel, is that it is an indeterminate space. This 
idea is expressed with poetic concision when the father tells his son that he does not 
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know whether the sea is still blue [ref]. It is, then, a vast blank canvas upon which 
they can project the precarious, weakly-entertained hopes that give them just enough 
motivation to continue.  
 
Temporally, then, the sea is futural, an idealised time of fantasy and projection that 
allows both protagonists to indulge in the fleeting thought that there might be an 
alternative to the searing jetztzeit of the road.  
 
But although the coast provides the space out of which a motivation to travel along 
the road emerges, it does not do anything to facilitate that journey. And this is where 
the third and final space of the novel comes into play. The space in question, perhaps 
the most important chronotope of the three, is that of the oikos or home. The idea of 
home has long been recognised as important in McCarthy‟s work, most notably by 
Terri Witek in her essay, „Reeds and Hides: Cormac McCarthy‟s Domestic Spaces‟, 
and Jay Ellis‟ 2006 book, No Place for Home: Spatial Constraint and Character 
Flight in the Novels of Cormac McCarthy. Witek notes a curious pattern. „Nearly all 
the protagonists in Cormac McCarthy novels flee from or lose their homes […] and 
yet McCarthy‟s characters seem compelled toward imitations of domesticity‟. 
 
This pattern is apparent in The Road too, where, in its multiple iterations, it 
constitutes an ongoing cyclical process. Although some of the domestic spaces in the 
novel are architecturally houses, and were once homes, this is by no means an 
essential condition, and is certainly not always the case. Often the places that allow 
for a domestic space to emerge, albeit always fleetingly, are house-like only in the 
barest, most reduced sense.  
James Corby (University of Malta) 
james.corby@um.edu.mt 
3 
 
This understanding of interior space is explored in Gaston Bachelard‟s 1958 work, 
The Poetics of Space. Bachelard, in a peculiarly heady mixing together of the 
philosophical and the poetic, recognises the basic shell- or nest-like seclusion offered 
by the house, but what is implied is that this is only the bare condition that allows the 
domestication of space to occur. That domestic space is, ultimately, non-
commensurable with its bare architectural condition – that it is, in other words, more 
culture than concrete – is supported by Bachelard‟s suggestion that „all really 
inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home‟. Materially, all that is 
required is „the slightest shelter‟, and from this „the imagination build[s] walls of 
impalpable shadows [or] comfort[s] itself with the illusion of protection‟ [5]. „[T]he 
sheltered being‟, then, „experiences the house in its reality and in its virtuality, by 
means of thought and dreams‟. Thus, for Bachelard, the non-commensurability 
between interior and architecture does not negate or proscribe the peculiar symbiosis 
that exists between the two. Shelter provides the minimal condition for the 
imaginative production of the oikos, the domestic space that harbours memories and 
dreams. It is on this point that Bachelard‟s topophilic panegyric takes full flight: 
[I]f I were asked to name the chief benefit of the house, I should say: the 
house shelters day-dreaming, the house protects the dreamer, the house allows 
one to dream in peace. [6] 
  
His task, he believes, is to „show that the house is one of the greatest powers of 
integration for the thoughts, memories and dreams of mankind‟. „Without it‟, he 
suggests, „man would be a dispersed being‟, and here we might recall Wallace 
Stevens‟ speculative hypothesis: „Suppose these houses are composed of ourselves‟. 
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Similarly, Henri Lefebvre comments that for Bachelard „[t]he relationship between 
Home and Ego […] borders on identity‟ [121].  
 
This identity develops out of the fertile ground of memory. In this strange chiasma of 
ego and oikos, the house must be understood as preserving the memories it generates 
[memories are housed – 8]; memories that are, of course, rooted in childhood. 
Bachelard asserts that the house is „the human being‟s first world‟ [7], „our first 
universe, a real cosmos in every sense of the word‟ (4). Contra Heidegger, it is the 
cradle one occupies before being cast into the world [7]. Temporally, then, home is 
always behind us, in our past, and yet, as such, it remains ahead of us, having come 
before us. The domestic spaces in The Road assume this backward looking temporal 
profile, complementing the temporal characteristics of the novel‟s two other 
chronotopes.  
 
If anything, M is even more parsimonious than B in his understanding of the minimal 
constitution of domestic space. McCarthy‟s is an austere aesthetic, of course, and so 
we would expect a certain economy in his rendering of such space. But, more than 
this, in the post-apocalyptic wasteland of The Road, any alternative to, or shelter 
from, the prevailing conditions, no matter how temporary or inadequate, can seem 
protective and sustaining and, as such, can open the space required for reflection and 
memory. 
 
We encounter the first space suggestive of such domesticity on page 4. It is not a 
house, but a „roadside gas station‟. Nor do the Man and Boy stay there overnight. And 
yet, it provides for them, offering a small amount of motor oil that they will be able to 
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use in their „little slutlamp‟, thus sustaining and protecting them, albeit in the most 
meagre and indigent manner. In this brief reprieve from the road, the gas station 
becomes also a place of memory and of childhood associations. The man feels 
compelled to pick up an old phone and dial „the number of his father‟s house in that 
long ago‟; a completely illogical action that puzzles the boy. A few pages later the 
boy and his father enter „an old batboard smokehouse‟, and find a ham, „[d]eep red 
and salty meat inside. Rich and good‟. It quickly becomes clear that although the 
chronotope of the sea provides the motivation to travel on the road, it is the domestic 
spaces that provide the sustaining physical and intellectual nourishment required for 
such a journey. 
 
This gives us the basic spatial structure of the road: the man and his son travel down 
the road towards the sea. There is nothing on the road itself that will sustain such a 
journey, so they regularly leave the road seeking to discover or improvise the basic 
characteristics of a house – shelter, warmth, dryness, food. Almost invariably they 
find at least one of these things, often a combination of them, or they find fuel or tools 
or something else that helps support and sustain human life, and in this process of 
recovering some of the basic elements of domestic life other, more intangible 
characteristics of domesticity and childhood are evoked, and the mood becomes 
decidedly retrospective. This happens at least a dozen times in the novel. 
 
These experiences of domesticity are always fleeting. No sooner have the father and 
son discovered and taken advantage of a sheltering, home-like space, than they are 
forced to abandon it to rejoin, once again, the road. And this takes us back to Witek‟s 
original insight that in McCarthy‟s novels the protagonists flee from or lose their 
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homes as well as apparently being drawn to approximations of domesticity. 
McCarthy‟s domestic spaces are rooted in tradition and memory, but otherwise they 
are transient. Location inexorably heralds dislocation; place gives way to 
displacement. The experience of being compelled from domestic space to its other 
(here symbolised by the road) is the novel‟s compulsively reiterated pattern. It is the 
shift from one chronotope or cultural space to another that in turn makes necessary the 
transformation or translation of the two chronotopes or cultural spaces into a way of 
thinking about the world capable of accommodating both in a manner that will allow 
them to remain distinct, their differences recognised and preserved. 
 
Let us consider this repeatedly replayed move from the oikos to the road as a sort of 
cultural translation. The oikos provides the space in which the man can be a father 
and the boy can be a son. It is, essentially, a private space. It sustains and shelters and 
offers enough of a sense of security for thoughts to rise above an immediate concern 
with survival and instead reflect backwards. It is a space of stories, memories and 
dreams, where the world is remade – not as it is, not even as it was, but as it ought to 
be. It is where the man and boy re-inscribe their moral identity as the good guys, the 
people who carry the fire. At the heart of the oikos, then, is a symbolic hearth 
sheltering a fire that they are protecting and carrying or translating; translating from 
one generation to another, translating from one culture to another. A translation, it is 
implied, upon which everything depends. 
 
The road, as already mentioned, is everything that the oikos isn‟t. Whereas the oikos 
is secluded and private, the road is unremittingly exposed and unsparingly public. It is 
no place for memories or stories or childhood. To have any hope of surviving, one 
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must have an unflinching understanding of how it is – how it ought to be is irrelevant, 
it is a place beyond both good and evil.  
 
The man travels the road without illusions and is fully conversant with its ways. He is 
able to conjure the discourse of the oikos for the benefit of his son, but he hardly 
believes in it anymore. He has accepted the harsh survivalist logic of the road and 
exercises it freely. For instance, upon confronting a man who has stolen all of their 
possessions, he forces the man to denude himself in the middle of the road and hand 
over his clothes; not killing him, then, but leaving him to face certain death. This 
ultimate denial of privacy, which exposes the thing itself, unaccommodated man, is a 
stark demonstration of the power and reach of the road, and it reveals the extent of the 
man‟s complicity with it. 
 
He is thus deeply resistant to the boy‟s inclination towards acts of selflessness. Quite 
naturally, having been inculcated in the law/culture of the oikos (eco nomy), the boy‟s 
expectation is that the empirical „is‟ must be made to submit to the ethical „ought‟, the 
law of the road to the law of the oikos (eco nomy). His first instinct, in other words, is 
to export unmodified the culture of the oikos to the road. The father realises that this 
is incompatible with survival on the road and this leads to clashes with his son, who, 
of course, is deeply troubled by his father‟s attitude, finding it very difficult to 
reconcile with their self-professed identity as the fire-carrying good guys. Out of this 
conflict of the domestic, pre-subjectival culture of the oikos and the rapaciously 
politicised life of the road, comes initial disappointment, followed by negotiation, 
readjustment, and, gradually, tentative, conditional, unsatisfied acceptance. 
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This process is of central importance in McCarthy‟s novel. It constitutes a motif that 
is replayed again and again, impressing upon us the possibility that the repeated 
forced abandonment of domestic spaces, traumatic though that is, might in fact be 
more appropriately understood in the context of a more general cultural tension or 
translation between the chronotope of the oikos and the chronotope of the road.  
 
In an attempt to try to understand what might be happening here, I would now like to 
turn to an essay by Jean-Francois Lyotard and an essay by Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak. In his 1988 essay „Oikos‟, Lyotard asks us to question the received wisdom 
that would have us believe that the oikos, the home, is a place of safety. On the 
contrary, he argues, the oikos „is above all the place of tragedy‟. With this precedent 
in mind, he sets about refashioning the Greek notion of oikeion as an alternative to 
common notions of Umwelt and ecology. Oikeion is traditionally translated as, 
variously, „one‟s own‟ or „appropriate‟ or „familiar‟, and, as Lyotard points out, „[i]n 
Greek, there is a very clear opposition between oikeion  and politikon’ [101]. The 
oikeion is „everything that can be called “domesticity” in the old Latin sense, that 
which is the domus‟. „In the final analysis‟, Lyotard writes, „oikeion is everything that 
is not öffentlich [public]‟. 
 
Lyotard wishes to suggest that, similar to the idea that at the heart of the oikos is 
tragedy, at the heart of the oikeion there is anxiety and repression. Lyotard‟s thesis is 
that the human being is born too soon and that our original oikos, our body, is ill-
prepared in relation to its Umwelt [103]. At the same time, however, in another sense 
„we are born too late because a lot of meanings or stories have already been narrated 
about our birth‟. „In this sense‟, writes Lyotard, „we are already the object of a lot of 
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meanings‟. On both counts, Lyotard seems to suggest, the outside (outside the body, 
note; he is not speaking of subjectivity here) is disclosed as a source of anxiety, which 
our „psychic apparatus‟ defensively represses. Thus, Lyotard identifies what he calls 
„a large element of childish anxiety that is a result of the fact that something is given, 
has been given, and will have been given to us before we are able to receive it, before 
we are in the condition of agreeing to it, before becoming aware of it‟ [105]. What 
results from this – Lyotard says „Call it what you will, the „unconscious‟ or whatever 
– is an opacity that resists openness and communication. „One can only describe this 
something‟, Lyotard writes, „as contradiction, tension, repression, deferral, 
displacement and in general distortion. All these concepts‟, Lyotard adds, „are terms 
of transport‟. Translations, in other words, that place at the heart of the oikeion „the 
thing that has not become public, that has not become communicational, that has not 
become systemic, and that can never become any of these things‟ [105].  
 
For Lyotard, this inherent complexity makes „us‟ who we are, makes „us‟ what we 
are. He states boldly: „I am describing a situation of distress, of suffering that is at the 
same time the mere condition of thinking and writing‟ [106]. It is, he says elsewhere 
in the essay, „the source of every invention, creation, and writing‟ [107]. Lyotard‟s 
general worry is over what the consequences might be if in the course of our 
technological development we were to erase „the question of birth, the question of 
childhood, the question of a certain anxiety‟. Giving flight to a posthuman fantasy, 
Lyotard writes: 
If we are sent to space after the explosion of the sun (I don‟t even know if it 
will be us), if something is sent to space without this extraordinary complexity 
that is precisely the paradox of childhood, I am afraid that this complexity is 
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not complex enough. In this case, we could call this by the terrible name of 
mere survival, which is not very interesting. I am not interested in surviving, 
not interested at all. I am interested in remaining a child. 
 
What Lyotard has set out, then, is a type of cultural translation that is constitutive of 
us, whatever that might mean; constitutive, certainly, of subjectivity. A cultural 
translation, in other words, between a pre-individuated entity and its surroundings; a 
cultural translation out of which we – all of us – emerge.  
 
In an essay called „Translation as Culture‟, Spivak, drawing on Melanie Klein and 
without reference to Lyotard, theorises a very similar procedure. And she gives it a 
name: „originary translation‟. She writes: 
The human infant grabs on to some one thing and then things. This grabbing 
of an outside indistinguishable from an inside constitutes an inside, going back 
and forth and coding everything in to a sign-system by the thing(s) grasped. 
One can call this crude coding a „translation‟. In this never-ending weaving, 
violence translates into conscience and vice versa. […] Thus „nature‟ passes 
and repasses into „culture‟, in a work or shuttling site of violence […]: the 
violent production of the precarious subject of reparation and responsibility. 
 
She goes on: 
 
…the human subject is something that will have happened as this shuttling 
translation, from inside to outside, from violence to conscience: the production 
of the ethical subject. 
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Spivak acknowledges that „the human infant, on the cusp of the natural and the 
cultural, is in translation‟, but implies that this condition of being in translation is 
coterminous with ethical subjectivity. Thus, although both Lyotard and Spivak locate 
what we can call originary translation in childhood, it is in fact a site or space of birth 
that endures and is carried with us for as long as we exist as ethical subjects. It is the 
condition of being open to the possibility of radical uncertainty and reappraisal, 
where, in Jakob von Uexkull‟s terms we are displaced to the extent that our umwelt 
becomes an object for us [see also Blanchot in the Infinite Conversation]. Being lost 
in translation, in other words, is the condition of ethical subjectivity. And it is what 
Lyotard means when he urges us to remain children. If we are no longer children in 
precisely this respect; if we are, that is to say, no longer open to the experience of 
originary translation, then we lose our ethical subjectivity and become mere survivors. 
In his essay „The Survivor‟, published in the same year as „Oikos‟, Lyotard writes: 
I understand childhood […] as obedience to a debt (which we can call a debt 
of life, of time, of event, a debt of being there in spite of everything), a debt 
for which only the persistent feeling of respect can save the adult from being 
no more than a survivor, a creature living on reprieve from annihilation. [149] 
 
Thus, originary translation is the translation of an initial debt, and to lose sight of that 
is to lose sight of what we are. The law of the oikos out of which we emerge – that is, 
our economy – means that we are always in debt; we emerge, overdrawn, out of a 
negative balance. I O U therefore I am, we might say.   
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But if all of this depends on the experience of childhood and the oikos, then suddenly 
what is really at stake in The Road becomes very clear, namely, the possible 
eradication of the oikos and, with it, the experience of originary translation. Indigent 
life may continue to survive, but that is the most it can do, and survival is barely life. 
Thus the man‟s quest in the novel, his real reason for travelling the road, is to preserve 
originary translation. And he seeks to do this by cultivating the discourse of the oikos 
in approximated domestic spaces, nurturing and guiding his son, though not always 
sympathetically, through an originary translation that, as we can see, bears the fruit of 
an ethical subjectivity. A subjectivity, the worth of which the man recognises, but 
which now lies dormant in him. The symbolic fire that they are carrying and wish to 
pass on, to translate, is, therefore, literally rekindled and strengthened in each 
impromptu hearth, in each improvised domus. 
 
This worry about the loss of the oikos as a distinct space is not, of course, without 
precedent, and it is in light of this that I would argue that the real concern of The 
Road is, paradigmatically, modernity, not the posthuman.  
 
In The History of Sexuality Vol. I, Foucault addresses what he calls the „threshold of 
modernity‟: 
For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with 
the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal 
whose politics places his existence as a living being in question. 
 
We have seen Lyotard contrast two distinct realms, the private space of the oikos and 
the public space of politics. What Foucault is here drawing our attention to is the fact 
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that these two realms designate two different understandings of life – zoē and bios. As 
Giorgio Agamben points out in his influential book Homo Sacer, the proper sphere of 
Zoe, or bare reproductive life, is the oikos. Bios, on the other hand, was understood to 
be public life in the political sphere. For Foucault, then, „the decisive event of 
modernity‟ is „the entry of zoe into the sphere of the polis – the politicisation of bare 
life as such‟ [agamben, p. 4]. 
 
On this diagnosis, then, modernity marks the loss of the private, the loss of a domestic 
space that resists, remains opaque to the political. The idiomatic, the singular, the 
secret, are forced into their opposite without translation. In The Road, the effect of 
this is often uncanny – derelict houses displaying evidence of past life, the man‟s 
dreams of his past intruding with shocking inappropriateness. These things strike an 
oddly discordant tone, and so they might: as Schelling once claimed, the „Unheimlich 
is the name for everything that ought to have remained … secret but has come to 
light.‟ 
 
If, therefore, modernity announced the gradual exposure and negation of the oikos, 
and, thus the inevitable decline of an originary translation that opens and yet is 
dependent upon the space of ethical subjectivity, McCarthy‟s The Road might very 
well be read as a warning from the near-future about our present and recent past. If 
this reading holds, then the father and son‟s struggle is our struggle, and originary 
translation is the only thing standing between us and survival. 
